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FINANCIAL STATEMENT INSURANCE:
A NEW APPROACH TO INVESTOR PROTECTION
Stephen Z. Surridge*
I. Introduction
The accounting profession rapidly is moving toward a crisis in liabil-
ity. Members of the investing public are suing accountants with mount-
ing frequency and success. This article will analyze briefly the origin and
present dimensions of the crisis, and then propose a plan for replacing
court-imposed liability with insured liability through the offering of
financial statement insurance. The essentials of the plan can be simply
stated. Insurance would be offered by accountants to investors on a
voluntary basis in conjunction with purchases and sales of corporate
stock and securities. Individual investors would be able to purchase
from the auditors of a corporation assurance that the most recent,
audited financial statements of that corporation in fact fairly represent its
financial condition as of the date of the statements. All investors would
be more confident of the independence of accountants, since a portion of
the accountants' compensation no longer would come directly from their
corporate clients. Amendments to the Securities Acts would insulate
accountants from liability to uninsured investors except in instances of
fraud or gross negligence constituting fraud.
II. Trend Toward Strict Liability
A. Recognition That Accountants Are Public Servants
The history of accountants' liability to the investing public for mis-
leading opinions on corporate financial statements is fundamentally a
story of changing attitudes toward the proper function of accountants in
society. Prior to the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts, courts viewed
accountants' provision of audit opinions as a service
... primarily for the benefit of the [corporate
client], a convenient instrumentality for use
in the development of the business, and only
incidentally or collaterally for the use of
those to whom [the client] might exhibit it
*Mr. Surridge is a third-year law student at the University of Michigan Law School.
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thereafter.' * * *
[Plublic accountants [were considered]
public only in the sense that their services are
offered to any one who chooses to employ
them. This is far from saying that those who
do not employ them are in the same position
as those who do.2
Accordingly although courts were willing to hold accountants liable to
investors for fraud and for gross negligence constituting fraud in the
conduct of an audit, they insisted upon privity of contract as a pre-
requisite to liability for simple negligence:
... [I]f there has been neither reckless mis-
statement nor insincere profession of an opin-
ion, but only honest blunder, the ensuing lia-
bility for negligence is one that is bounded by
the contract, and is to be enforced between
the parties by whom the contract has been
made.
3
The Securities Acts brought with them an entirely different view of
the accountants' function. Their purpose was "to protect the investor,
maintain integrity and honesty in the securities market, and curb 'unnec-
essary, unwise, and destructive speculation.' "4 The 1933 Act dealt with
original issues, the 1934 Act with securities trading. The general ap-
proach of the Acts was to provide investors with full disclosure of all
relevant information about companies and their stock and security is-
sues. One of the specific devices selected to ensure disclosure was the
requirement that each registration statement, each prospectus issued
pursuant thereto, and each corporate annual report contain statements of
financial position and of income certified by an independent public
accountant or a certified public accountant.5
Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 swept aside the requirement
of privitv between accountants and the investors, and imposed upon
accountants liability to investors for simple negligence. 6 "[N]ot only is
it immaterial that privity is totally lacking between the accountant and
the investor, but it-is also of no consequence that the misrepresentation
was neither addressed to him nor intended to influence him." ' 7 For
1 Ultramaries v. Touche, 255 N.Y. 170, 183, 174 N.E. 441, 446 (1931).
2 1d. at 188, 174 N.E. at 448.
3 
Id. at 189, 174 N.E. at 448.4 H. R. REP. No. 1383, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1934), quoted in Drake v. Thor Power
Tool Co., 282 F. Supp. 94, 102 (N.D. III. 1967).
5 Securities Act §10(a)(1), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §77j(a)(1), (1965); and Schedule A(25),
(26), 15 U.S.C. §§77aa(25), (26), (1965); Securities Exchange Act §13(a)(2), as
amended, 15 U.S.C. §78m(a)(2). (1965).
6 Securities Act §§Il(a)(4) and 1l(b)(3)(B)(i), as amended, 15 U.S.C. §§77k(a)(4) and
77k(b)(3)(B)(i), (1965).




liability to be established it is unnecessary for the investor to prove that
he relied on the accountants' certification. Once the investor establishes
that the financial statements misstate or omit a material fact such as to
render the statements misleading, section 11 places the burden upon the
accountants to demonstrate that they were not negligent. As is true of
any negative fact, proving the absence of negligence is not an easy task.
As most clearly evidenced by section 11 of the 1933 Act, the Secu-
rities Acts recast the role of the accountant into that of a truly public
servant whose chief responsibility is to the investing public rather than
to his client. When the laws were first passed, this role for the accoun-
tant was novel, and courts were slow to impose the liabilities that the
laws sought to create. This lag is reflected in the first Restatement of the
Law of Torts, adopted and promulgated by the American Law Institute
in 1938, five years after passage of the 1933 Act. The 1938 Restatement
recognised a duty on the part of
[o]ne who in the course of his business or
profession supplies information for the guid-
ance of others... [only toward]the person or
one of the class of persons for whose guid-
ance the information was supplied
.... [Emphasis added]. 8
In contrast to this characterization of the accountants' duty, Tentative
Draft #10 of the Restatement (Second) of the Law of Torts, published
in 1964, added new language recognising that
The liability of one who is under a public
duty to give information extends to loss
suffered by any of the class of persons for
whose benefit the duty is created, in any
transactions in which it is intended to protect
them. [Emphasis added].9
The 1938 wording indicates that the Institute-and likewise the
courts-saw the accountants' duty of care as one growing out of the
immediate transaction of performing an audit for a client. The 1964
wording indicates that at least the Restatement reporters have arrived at
a view which is consistent with characterization of the accountants' duty
of care as one which grows out of the statutes creating the public duty.
The Institute reporters altered view also appears in the recent Dis-
trict Court case of Fischer v. Kletzt 0 wherein the court adopted as its
8
RESTATEMENT OF TORTS §552 (1938).
o RESTATEMENT SECOND OF TORTS §552 (Tent. Draft No. 10, 1964). Comments to the
draft clarify that persons other than public officials may be subject to such public
duties. Id., No. 5 at 179.
10 266 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
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own the language of the Securities and Exchange Commission to the
effect that when an accountant performs services as a statutory "inde-
pendent public accountant", his responsibility
... is not only to the client who pays his fee,
but also to investors, creditors and others
who may rely on the financial statements
which he certifies .... The public accountant
must report fairly on the facts as he finds
them whether favorable or unfavorable to his
client. His duty is to safeguard the public
interest not that of his client. [Emphasis
added]."
This language does not suggest that accountants owe equal duties to
their clients and to the investing public, but rather that the duty to
safeguard the public interest is primary.
In the recent and much-discussed case of Escott v. BarChris Con-
struction Corporation,12 purchasers of the debentures of BarChris
brought an action against that corporation's auditors alleging that the
certified financial statements published in the debenture registration
statement contained material false statements and material omissions.
As discussed earlier, section 11 of the 1933 Act places the burden on
the defendant to demonstrate lack of negligence. In BarChris, the court
concluded that the accountants had not carried that burden of proof. The
court considered the audit program employed to have been adequate,
but found that the accountants were negligent in applying the program.
Judge McLean was careful to say that "[a~ccountants should not be
held to a standard higher than that recognised in their profession,"' 13 but
some of the particulars of his criticism indicate that he did not consider
the accountants' approach to their review to be acceptable:
... [the accountant] read only what min-
utes [a company executive] gave him .... He
did not read such minutes as there were of
the executive committee. He did not know
there was an executive committee....
In substance.... [hie asked questions, he
got answers which he considered satisfactory,
and he did nothing to verify them.
.... He was content with... [a company ex-
ecutive's] assurance that no liability there-
tofore contingent had become direct.
14
"In re Touche, Niven, Baily & Smart, 37 S.E.C. 629, 670-71 (1957), quoted in Fisher v.
Kletz, 266 F. Supp. 180, 184 (S.D.N.Y. 1967). See also Drake v. Thor Power Tool
Co., 282 F. Supp. 94, 104 (N.D.1i1. 1967).
12 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. 643 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
13 Id. at 703.
14 Id. at 702.
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The company executives with whom the accountant spoke purposely
misled him, and purposely withheld information from him. The court's
criticism of the accountant boils down to condemnation for failure to see
through the client's deception-condemnation for believing what client
executives told him.
Upon reflection it should be apparent that a significant proportion of
the data and records examined by accountants during the conduct of an
audit are, in one form or another, representations made to them by
employees and officers of the client corporations. If accountants never
can believe anything told to them by their clients, the conduct of audits,
if possible at all, becomes tantamount to a police investigation of the
clients. Under this characterization of the audit function, accountants'
obligation to their nominal clients is virtually extinguished.
B. Disregard of Apparent Statutory Protections
Court decisions have moved progressively farther toward recognising
the full implications of the now-altered source and object of the accoun-
tants' primary duty, and, indeed, are on the brink of extending to in-
vestors rights and remedies significantly larger than those which one
might have expected to grow out of the specific wording of the Securities
Acts. Whereas section 11 of the 1933 Act holds accountants liable to
investors for simple negligence in the rendering of certifications of finan-
cial statements for inclusion in securities registration statements, the
only section of the 1934 Act which clearly imposes liability upon ac-
countants, section 18, relieves them from liability in the rendering of
certifications of financial statements for inclusion in corporate annual
reports if any misrepresentations therein contained were unintentional.
Also, under section 18, a plaintiff must prove damage caused by reliance
upon the statements.
If section 18 remains the only basis for liability under the 1934 Act,
then accountants will have a much easier time resisting claims brought
by persons who buy or sell securities over the counter or through the
national exchanges than they can hope to have resisting claims brought
under section 11 of the 1933 Act by persons who purchase securities
upon their original issuance. In the past few years, however, the case
law has moved rapidly toward establishing a cause of action against
accountants for negligence under section 10 (b) of the 1934 Act, and
Rule lOb-5 promulgated thereunder. 15
15 Rule lOb-5 states that:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly,
by the use of any means or instrumentality of interstate
commerce, or of the mails or of any facility of any
national securities exchange.. or to make any untrue
statement of a material fact or to omit to state a material
April 19691
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Whether negligence is sufficient under Rule lOb-5, or whether intent
must be established, is a question which as yet remains unsettled. The
growing weight of authority, however, is to the effect that negligence is
sufficient. Two federal appellate courts have so held, and two others
have expressed this view in dicta. 18 Only the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit has held that intent must be established. 17 That court
cited only two cases in support of the proposition, and the citations seem
erroneous.' 8 When the question eventually is raised before the United
States Supreme Court, accountants might hope that the Court will side
with the second circuit. However, this writer expects that it will not.
fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in
the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading.. . in connection with the purchase
or sale of any security. 17 C.F.R. 240, 10b-5.
16 For holdings to the effect that negligence is sufficient, see Ellis v. Carter, 291 F.2d 270,
274 (9th Cir. 1961); and Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374, 379 (10tb Cir. 1965). For
dicta to the same effect, see Kohler v. Kohler Co., 319 F.2d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 1963),
affg 208 F. Supp. 803 (E.D. Wis. 1962); and Myzel v. Fields, 386 F.2d 718, 734-35
(8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied 390 U.S. 951 (1968).
17 Fischman v. Raytheon Mfg. Co., 188 F.2d 783,,786-87 (2d Cir. 1951).
18The court cited Norris & Hirschberg, Inc., v. SEC, 177 F.2d 228, 230 (D.C. Cir. 1948);
Ward La France Truck Corp., 13 SEC 373, 381 (1943). Neither case supports the
proposition that proof of fraud is required in suits under §10b of the 1934 Act, or
Rule lOb-5.
Norris held that concealment of certain information by a -brokerage firm constituted
willful violation of the Securities Acts, and that the willful violation was a sufficient
ground for revocation of petitioner's registration, adding the dictum that "a registra-
tion cannot be revoked unless there has been willful violation of statute." 177 F.2d at
233 [Emphasis added]. At the cited page, Norris indicates that the case was initiated,
after an S.E.C. investigation, by an S.E.C. "order directing a private proceeding
before a trial examiner in order to determine whether petitioner had violated any of
the anti-fraud provisions of the Securities Act of 1933, the Securities Exchange Act
of 1934, or any of the Commission's rules promulgated thereunder," footnoting the
statutes generally. Apparently the court in Fischman meant to infer-from this
language and from the fact that the commission subsequently found petitioners in
Norris to have violated Section 10b of the 1934 Act-that the Norris court had
labeled Section 10b as an "anti-fraud provision." Even if this inference is correct,
such a label would not preclude the possibility that Congress intended Section l0b to
be applied where less than fraud was involved.
The reference to the La France case is to a footnote which reads:
The standards adopted by'the Commission in its rule
[Rule lob-5], it will be noted, make applicable to the
purchase of securities, the same broad antifraud provi-
sions which the Congress has imposed in Section 17(a)
of the Securities Act of 1933, in connection with the sale
of securities. [Emphasis added].
Again, the Fischman court's reference is to a label of uncertain application, and not
to a holding which requires proof of fraud. In La France the Commission held that
purchase of stock by insiders without disclosure of material information to the sellers
constituted a violation of Rule 1Ob--5; the Commission nowhere asserted-even as
dictum- that fraud was essential to a violation of that rule.
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Accountants, in appraising the situation, might consider that none of the
comforting defenses available under section 18 are to be found under
section 10b. Indeed, if the Supreme Court holds that Rule lOb-5 can be
applied in instances of negligence, nothing will remain of the wording
of that rule to preclude its application to impose strict liability.
The imposition upon accountants of strict liability under tle Securities
Acts could come about even if the current trend of expanding liability
and diminishing defenses is not carried that far via statutory inter-
pretation. Negligence is a highly subjective concept, and it is always
possible for a judge to conclude that an auditor should have done more
than he did. In the BarChris case, Judge McLean could not resist
observing in his opinion that "As far as results were concerned, his [the
accountant's]... review was useless."1 9 The more sympathetic a judge is
to a plaintiff's case, the greater the likelihood that he will give weight to
results in evaluating the defendant's performance. Widespread recogni-
tion of accountants' statutory duty will increase the probability that
judges will be sympathetic toward complaining investors. Under such
circumstances, the line between liability for negligence and strict liability
could become very blurred indeed.
III. Response of Accountants
A. Present: Resistance to Liability
The potential for further expansion of accountants' liability to third
party investors is too great to be ignored. So far the accounting profes-
sion has reacted to this situation by resisting and defending against
liability with all possible zeal. Very early in the game the accountants
retreated from "certifying" financial statements, and instead undertook
only to render "opinions" with respect to them. This ploy was intended
to avoid the danger that if financial statements are certified as fact, and if
those statements are false, the accountants may be held liable at com-
mon law for deceit.20 Accountants also assert that their audit procedures
"cannot be relied upon, to disclose defalcations and other similar irre-
gularities... 1,21 Try saying that to a man on the street who has just
invested heavily in some corporation, having based his decision to do so
partly upon the corporation's most recent audited financial statements,
and see how he reacts!
The Accounting Principles Board of the American Institute of Cer-
tified Public Accountants has noticeably increased the frequency and
19 Escott v. BarChris Constr. Corp., 283 F. Supp. at 702.
2 0
A. HOLMES, AUDITING PRINCIPLES AND PROCEDURE 28 (6th ed. 1964).
21 American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, Auditing Standards and Procedures
(Statements on Auditing Procedure No. 33) 11 (1963).
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specificity of its pronouncements of late, clearly with the intent of more
explicitly defining audit procedures and narrowing statement presenta-
tion alternatives. 22 The accountants apparently believe that if they can
clarify and render niore uniform the standards of their own profession
and then follow those standards closely, they can avoid liability. This
belief very possibly is correct to the extent that liability may be founded
upon certified fiancial statements deemed misleading because of their
manner of presentation, or because information known to the accoun-
tants is omitted by an exercise of judgement with which a court dis-
agrees. To the extent that liability may be founded upon certified
financial statements deemed misleading because the accountant failed to
discover or accurately to record pertinent information, however, an
assertion of compliance with professional standards inevitably will carry
the implication that those professional standards, and perhaps even the
professionals themselves, are inadequate to their task. Accountants will
lose the war if they win too many battles against this type of liability.
If accountants continue their zealous resistance to liability, they are
likely to experience two disasterous results: (1) The public will cease to
look to the auditor's opinion as an assurance that it is receiving adequate
information upon which to base investment decisions, and (2) the Secu-
rities and Exchange Commission will begin to look elsewhere for ways
to accomplish the purposes of the Securities Acts. Conceivably, Con-
gress might even go to the extent of writing independent public accoun-
tants out of the Securities Acts and replacing them with government
inspectors. No certified public accountant would welcome that result.
It is imperative that accountants see beyond their immediate danger of
financial loss to their ultimate danger of extinction as a profession. If the
general public is to place confidence in audited financial statements, it
must believe that the auditors stand behind their work. Accountants can
be stubborn, and fight liability in the courts, but success in such efforts
would lead to destruction of their professional stature.
B. Proposed: Financial Statement Insurance
If accountants would recognise now the inevitability of expanded
liability, perhaps they might stop working so hard to defend against it
and instead direct their efforts toward providing an alternative solution
to the underlying problem which, after all, is that of finding a means of
compensating investors who rely upon financial statements which turn
out to have been in error. A little positive thinking should reveal that the
accountants' supposed plight is actually a tremendous opportunity. In-
stead of shrinking from liability, accountants should seek it-for a price.
22 During the decade 1950-59, the Committee on Auditing Procedure of the American
Institute of Certified Public Accountants issued only five new "'Statements on Audit-
ing Procedure." During the period 1960 through January 1969, ten such statements
were issued, doubling the number of the previous decade.
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Potential liability toward investors would not be so burdensome if the
accountants regularly received all or a portion of their compensation
from those same investors.
As the role of accountants hag moved away from serving their clients
and toward serving the public, retention of the old scheme of com-
pensation has become an anomaly. The accountants are compensated by
those whom they are to scrutinize, and the public-the primary bene-
ficiary of their services-pays not at all. But for the threat of liability
imposed by a court of law, there is very little financial motivation of
accountants toward doing a good job. The Securities Acts guarantee that
corporations will employ their services, and the corporations pay their
accountants' fees regardless of the degree of care with which they
perform their audit. The public might speculate that the only basis upon
which a corporation selects one accounting firm over another is the
relative congeniality and cooperativeness of that firm's personnel.
Seemingly, the public would be more confident of the accountants'
independence from corporate management if someone other than man-
agement were paying the bills, and the public would be more confident
of the accountants' professional competence iftheir remuneration were
directly dependent upon that competence.
Many have suggested that accountants can meet the cost of expanded
liability by passing that cost on to their clients. To do so would amount
to funding the risk of liability by charges to clients, which charges would
be well in excess of the actual costs of performing the audits themselves.
Advocates of this solution would have the accountants seek to exact
larger fees from their clients at the very time when pressure is on the
accountants to scrutinize their clients more thoroughly. This is hardly a
proposal that would foster independence on the part of the auditor.
The advocates of increased direct charges argue that a charge exacted
from the client is actually a charge exacted indirectly from investors,
since the assets of a corporation are owed to its creditors, or belong to
its stockholders. This indirect incidence of such a charge, however,
would not parallel the incidence of potential damage through reliance on
audited financial statements. The investors who should bear the brunt of
corporate financial reverses, or who should enjoy the fruits of corporate
successes, are the investors who hold stock or securities in the corpo-
ration at the time such reverses or successes occur. If the same persons
hold the stock or securities at the time such reverses or successes
eventually are discovered and reported, then those persons have not
been damaged by an accountant's failure to have discovered and report-
ed the change of circumstances at the earliest opportunity. Only those
persons who change their positions by buying or selling stock between
the time of occurrence of a reverse or success and the time of its
eventual reporting will have been damaged by a delay in its reporting.
Those who may have been damaged by inaccurate financial statements
will be contained in the list of those who have bought or sold stock or
April 19691
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securities, but not necessarily in the list of those who held stock or
securities at the time the accountant conducted his audit and assessed
his charges against the corporation. Yet the latter group would be the
one to bear the indirect burden of increased charges assessed against the
corporation. Thus, increasing client charges would merely perpetuate
the anomaly of charging one group for services actually provided to
another group.
An alternative more desirable than increased direct charges would be
for accountants to receive all or a portion of their total compensation in
the form of payments from investors incident to each individual pur-
chase or sale of their client corporation's stock and securities. Then
those persons who could be damaged by inaccurate financial state-
ments - those who buy or sell in reliance upon the statements - would be
actual purchasers of the accountants' services.
Accountants could offer insurance somewhat analogous to title insur-
ance, the insurance to be purchased by investors incident to their pur-
chase or sale of corporate stock or securities. It would be offered by the
accounting firm that had audited and rendered an opinion on the most
recent financial statements of the corporation, and would insure against
the possibility that those financial statements did not fairly present the
financial conditior of the corporation as of the date of the statements.
The insurance would relate only to the transaction incident to which it
was purchased, and thus would not be transferable between successive
investors in the same stock or security. The insurance would be pur-
chased directly from the appropriate accounting firm upon submission of
a document provided by the investor's broker, which document would
verify the fact and amount of a purchase or sale.
All purchases of the insurance would be voluntary. 23 If an investor
chose not to buy the insurance, he would be evidencing his intent not to
23 Accountants are in no position to demand payments directly from investors, because the
Securities Acts require the corporations to secure certification of their financial
statements. Demanding that accountants' corporate clients collect such payments
from purchasers of their stocks and securities would be feasible only with respect to
original issues, because corporations have no control over who buys or sells their
stocks and securities on the exchanges or over the counter. Imposition of such
demands upon corporations might subject both the accountants and their clients to
prosecution under the antitrust laws anyway. The types of antitrust obstacles that this
approach might encounter only will be suggested here, and will not be analyzed in
detail. If all accountants explicitly agree to refuse to provide audit services except on
condition that the corporations to be audited require persons purchasing original
issues of stock and securities to make payments to the accountants, the agreement
might be condemned under § I of the Sherman Act as a concerted refusal to deal. See
Paramount Famous Lasky Corp. v. United States, 282 U.S. 30 (1930). If accountants
uniformly refuse to provide audit services except upon the same condition, but there
is no express agreement, then a conspiracy to refuse to deal nevertheless would be
present if a tacit agreement in fact did exist. This again might be condemned under § 1
of the Sherman Act. See Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp.,
[Vol. 2:2
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rely upon the financial statements, and consequently should have no
cause of action against the accountants for loss growing out of his
transaction. If an investor did buy the insurance and suffered loss, he
only would have to establish the inaccuracy of the financial statements
in order to recover from the accountants. This is the same minimal
burden of proof that would be enjoyed by all investors if the courts
advance their current trend of decisions to the point of holding accoun-
tants strictly liable to investors.
The risks against which insurance is to be provided must be limited
and measurable at the time the risks are incurred, or else premium
rates cannot be established on a rational basis. In the situation of an
error which results in an overstatement of a corporation's financial
condition, the risk would be limited and measurable. Clearly the max-
imum injury which could occur would be the amount of the over-
statement, and that maximum injury would be inflicted only in the event
that all stock and securities were traded at least once before the error
was discovered. Since the overstatement could be no larger than the
value of the entire corporation which could be deduced fairly from the
financial statements, that value would be the theoretical maximum injury
that could be inflicted by an overstatement. That some securities or
'9hares of stock might be traded more than once during the period
be wYeen the date of the statements and the date of discovery of the error
would not alter this result; only those holding the stock and securities
when the error was discovered could have lost from the delay. Suppose
346 U.S. 537 (1954). If a corporation did predicate issuance of its stock and secu-
rities upon such a condition, then that corporation might be vulnerable to suit under
§ 1 of the Sherman Act for an offense analogous to an illegal tying arrangement. The
corporation would be using whatever economic- power it could muster to coerce
purchase of insurance by investors from the corporation's accountants. To the extent
this effort was successful, other insurers that might be willing to offer comparable
insurance would be excluded. This situation is similar to that in Atlantic Ref. Co. v.
FTC, 381 U.S. 357 (1965), wherein Atlantic was enjoined from further coercing its
wholesalers and retail outlets to carry Goodyear products. While §3 of the Clayton
Act, the statutory section specifically addressed to the tying problem, does not apply
to this situation because that section, by its terms, only concerns "goods, wares,
merchandise, machinery, supplies, or other commodities," tying arrangements in-
volving other marketable items have been held unlawful under § I of the Sherman
Act. That neither the tying nor the tied items fall within the language of Clayton Act
§3 does not preclude application of Sherman Act §1. The same situation existed in
Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States 356 U.S. 1 (1958), wherein agreements to use
Northern Pacific's rail routes exclusively were tied to sales and leases of land; the
agreements were held to be violations of Sherman Act § 1.
Of course, it would be possible to coerce payments from investors by force of
federal statute. A statute merely requiring that investors pay to accountants whatever
fees the accountants demand would go against the main thrust of the Securities Acts,
which is to protect investors. Thus any coercive statute necessarily would provide for
government establishment of rates. At best, such a statute would make the govern-




that as to a given share of stock the amount of the overstatement were
$10, and the true value of the share at the time of the financial state-
ments were X. Anyone purchasing the share on that day would pay $(X
+ 10). If that person sold the share before discovery of the error, then he
would sell it for whatever its true value might then happen to be, Y, plus
the same $10 overstatement. The overstatement would have had pre-
cisely the same effect on the share's buying and selling prices, and thus
the person both buying and selling while the error remained undisco-
vered would suffer no injury.
On the other hand, in the situation of an understatement of a corpo-
ration's financial position, the risk would not be limited and measurable.
The aggregate value of items omitted from financial statements cannot
be known until the omissions are discovered. Thus the accountants
could not know their maximum potential liability. To state an extreme
example, it is conceivable that an audit might fail to reveal that the client
corporation had recently discovered valuable oil reserves not reflected
on its books. The potential resultant injury to investors who sell before
the omission from the financial statements is reported would be limited
to the value of the oil reserves, but that value niether would have been
known nor foreseeable at the time of the original omission. The value
could be larger than all other assets of the corporation, and an unfore-
seen liability of such magnitude might financially ruin the accountants.
24
Even though the potential liability for an understatement of financial
position is unlimited, the proposed insurance plan provides accountants
with an opportunity to place a contractual upper limit on that liability,
thus permitting premium rates to be established rationally.
Obviously, the proposed insurance would be of no value to investors
if the courts reach the point of holding accountants strictly liable toward
all investors regardless of whether they had purchased it. In that event
there would be no way to induce investors to make any voluntary
payments to accountants. Such an insurance plan, therefore, ought only
be undertaken in conjunction with securing amendments to the Secu-
rities Acts to guarantee that investors who do not establish privity of
contract with the accountants by purchasing the insurance will be able to
recover from the accountants only in instances of fraud or gross negli-
gence constituting fraud. As already pointed out, the need which under-
lies the current judicial trend toward strict liability is that of com-
pensating investors who rely upon financial statements which turn out to
have been in error. Surely both the Securities and Exchange Commis-
24 In such a situation there would be a high probability that failure of the audit to reveal the
discovery of the oil reserves would be the direct result of intentional non-disclosure
by executives of the corporation so that the accountants would have an action over
against those executives. Nevertheless, if the executives are judgement proof, the
accountants conceivably could find themselves stuck with liability to injured investors
for the full value of the oil reserves.
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sion and Congress would be receptive to a plan which offers to provide
that compensation in a manner both economical and equitable in that it
(1) restricts recovery to investors clearly identified as having relied upon
the statements, and (2) minimizes the litigation burden upon those who
so rely.
The proposed insurance plan also would cause accountants' financial
rewards to vary directly with their own professional competence. The
more diligent their audit examinations, the fewer the instances of error
resulting in liability, and the more premiums the accountants will be able
to keep for themselves. The reader might observe that if accountants are
to provide insurance, there must be some mechanism to hold down the
magnitude of the premiums charged, lest accountants simply insure
against the risk that unaudited financial statements might be in error and
retire from their original profession. The proposed plan, however, does
not contemplate relief from liability toward uninsured investors for fraud
or gross negligence constituting fraud, so the necessity of conducting an
audit would remain. Furthermore, the offering of insurance would in-
troduce an opportunity for price competition not heretofore existent in
the market for auditing services. In the past, stockholders have had little
or no basis upon which to evaluate corporate management's choice of
auditors prior to voting to approve or disapprove that choice. With an
insurance plan in effect, stockholders could vote against accounting
firms which charge particularly high premiums. As a final check against
excessive premium charges, the charges could be subject to S.E.C.
scrutiny.
IV. Conclusion
Accountants eventually will become strictly liable to the investing
public for all material errors in, and omissions from, audited financial
statements-one way or another. Surely accountants, as professional
men, would prefer to arrive at that position voluntarily, rather than by
force of court decisions. A significant advantage to voluntary assump-
tion of liability would be the added financial benefit to be derived. The
accounting profession must decide soon, for if it does not, the opportun-
ity to decide could be foreclosed.
April 1969)
